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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a closer view on the interaction of exchange 
rate volatility and interest rate volatility in the Mercosur countries. We discuss several 
models that explain systematic correlations between the movements of both variables 
and their second statistical moments, i.e. their volatilities. In contrast to the “fear of 
floating” argument that could lead to a volatility trade-off, we argue that both 
variables are largely driven either by the credibility of a country or by politics in 
general and thus should move in the same direction. Subsequently, we test this 
hypothesis of a positive correlation between both variables empirically. As a final 
step, we control for the impact of third variables such as exchange rate misalignment, 
financial stress, and monetary volatility. Our results show that – independent from 




El objetivo de este estudio es examinar en detalle la interacción entre el tipo de 
cambio y el tipo de interés en los paises del Mercosur. Se discuten varios modeles que 
expliquan el comportamiento de las dos variables. Un argumento común es el „fear of 
floating“ que puede resultar en un trade-off de volatilidades. En comparación, 
argumentamos que las dos variables son influidas o por la credibilidad de un país o 
por política y por ese motivo se moverán en la misma dirección. En la segunda parte 
del texto analizamos, empiricamente, la correlación entre las dos variables. 
Finalmente se analiza la influencia de terceras variables como misvaloración del tipo 
de cambio real, tensiones en el mercado financiero y volatilidad monetaria. Nuestros 
resultados muestran que – independiente de terceras variables – existe un movimiento 
similar del tipo de cambio y del tipo de interés en los paises del Cono Sur. - 1 - 
 
1.  Introduction 
After the forced exit from its currency board arrangements Argentina has joined its 
neighbors in the Southern Cone in terms of its exchange rate arrangement. After the 
break-up of the Brazilian currency regime in 1999, the obviously differing exchange 
rate systems of the Mercosur countries have been held responsible for the missing 
progresses towards a deeper monetary integration in Latin America. But probably this 
will not be the end of the story. The actual problems that appeared as an outcome of 
the Argentinean and Brazilian crises have shown that an optimal exchange rate system 
for Latin American countries is far from being found. 
In Europe, a similar crisis (1992/3/5) could not impede monetary union. Thus, 
monetary integration could one day again become a real option for the Mercosur area 
as well.
1 As an alternative, target zones and fixed exchange rates (to the U.S. dollar 
and/or to the euro) still are subject to discussions. 
One key feature of a fixed exchange rate regime is lower exchange rate volatility. 
Thus, to qualify the costs and benefits of fixed regimes, it is essential to quantify the 
effects of a lower exchange rate volatility on other economic variables such as interest 
rates, investment, and labor markets. The last two effects are investigated more 
detailed in Belke and Gros (2002). But not only exchange rate policy might be a 
source of potential costs – also interest rate policy could impose costs. The purpose of 
this paper is to provide a closer view on how exchange rate volatility and interest rate 
volatility are linked in the Mercosur countries.  
                                                           
1 Before the outbreak of the Argentina crisis, some authors like, e.g., Eichengreen (1998) and 
Giambiagi (1999) even discussed the sense or nonsense of a common currency for the Mercosur 
member countries. Corresponding declarations of intention were made at that time by policy circles, i.e. 
the president of Argentina, Fernando de la Rúa, and by the president of Brazil, Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso. An instructive source in this respect is Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000). - 2 - 
 
Our paper proceeds as follows. After explaining why one should take care of the 
interaction between exchange rates and interest rate in the Southern Cone (section 2) 
we document the theoretical framework which serves as a benchmark for our 
statistical tests of the nature of correlation between volatilities (trade-off versus co-
movement) (section 3). The latter are conducted in section 4. Section 4.1 explains our 
measures of volatility. Section 4.2 presents some simple tests of the significance and 
of the sign of the correlation between the relevant volatility measures. Section 5 
checks whether these first results are robust with respect to the consideration of 
potential third variables. Section 6 draws the implications of the results for the debate 
on the suitable exchange rate regime for the Southern Cone. 
2.  Motivation 
What drives interest rate volatility? In an OECD country with a flexible exchange rate 
one would consider short term domestic interest rates to constitute a measure of 
monetary policy. In emerging market economies this might not be the case, whatever the 
exchange rate regime. Especially for highly indebted countries like Argentina and Brazil, 
developments in international financial markets might be much more important. Both 
exchange rates and interest rates can shoot up if foreign financing is no longer available 
(contagion after the Asian and Russian crisis) or the perception in international financial 
markets of the country's political and economic future changes (witness the 30 % 
depreciation of the real when present-day president Lula da Silve had a lead in the 
opinion polls).  
It can by now be considered a stylized fact that exchange rates are “disconnected” from 
fundamentals (e. g., Obstfeld and Rogoff 2000 and the July 2002 issue of the Journal of 
Monetary Economics). To a certain extent, section 5 below gives additional support to 
this view using the second statistical moment. It finds that there is a significant - 3 - 
 
correlation between exchange rates and monetary policy but that this correlation cannot 
be interpreted in the sense of a direct bilateral causal relationship. Third variables like the 
constant threat of a speculative attack on emerging market economies can actually cause 
a co-movement of exchange rates and interest rates, which does not exist for developed 
economies as reported by Belke and Gros (2002a). They find that the correlation 
coefficient between the volatilities of the bilateral dollar/euro exchange rate and the 
respective interest rate differential is essentially zero (around 0.1). 
However, we cannot rule out in this contribution that variability in the exchange rate and 
the interest rate are jointly caused by variability in monetary policy. If this were the case 
the cost of exchange rate volatility reported here should be considered the cost of erratic 
monetary policy. However, we are confident that for Argentina and Brazil the general 
“disconnect” between exchange rates and fundamentals also holds in the short run, and is 
even extended to (domestic) interest rates, which for emerging markets largely are 
determined by shocks coming from international financial markets. 
There is a number of works on the interaction between exchange rate volatility and 
interest rate volatility: Some authors like, e. g., Reinhart and Reinhart (2001) argue that 
there is a trade-off between lower G-3 exchange rate volatility on the one hand and 
higher G-3 interest rate volatility (and consumption) on the other hand. As the main 
reason it is presumed that major countries can only accomplish a lower degree of 
exchange rate volatility if their central banks change short-term interest rates as a 
reaction to cross exchange rate changes. This, in turn, tends to increase G-3 income and 
spending volatility. The latter effects spill over to emerging market economies which are 
net debtors to the G-3 in different ways. First, coordination of G-3 monetary policies 
delivers more stable terms of trade for the emerging markets at the cost of a more 
variable interest service on foreign debt. This might hamper investment within the - 4 - 
 
emerging market economies. Second, the higher degree of G-3 interest volatility makes 
the demand for the emerging markets’ exports more variable if import demand in the G-
3 has a positive income elasticity. However, the larger the foreign trade ties with the 
larger country the more important this kind of spill-over effect should be in reality. 
Those emerging market economies which predominantly export relatively income-
inelastic primary commodities will not suffer to the same extent from an increase in G-3 
interest rate volatility like developing countries do which export income-elastic 
manufacturing goods. In other words, the export performance of countries like, e. g., 
Argentina should be less exposed to G-3 interest rate variability like that of East Asian 
countries (Reinhart and Reinhart 2001, pp. 7 ff.). 
Reinhart and Reinhart examine volatility between G-3 currencies – but what we examine 
here is volatility between G-3 and emerging markets’ currencies what has also been 
analyzed by Calvo and Reinhart (2000). They apply a similar argument like Reinhart and 
Reinhart (2001) directly to emerging market economies. If the authorities lack credibility 
and if there is an inherent “fear of floating”, the outcome is biased towards lower 
conditional exchange rate volatility (towards G-3) and higher interest rate volatility 
within the emerging market economies themselves (“pro interest variability bias”, Calvo 
and Reinhart 2000, p. 8). Their empirical analysis for thirty-nine countries (including 
Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay) and monthly data ranging from January 1970 to April 
1999 corroborates exactly this conclusion, independent on whether the country under 
investigation is classified as a peg or a float. Hence, the authors conclude that the so-
called “demise of fixed exchange rates” which is often maintained referring to the 
examples of, e. g., Brazil, Chile, and Colombia is not more than a myth. However, 
according to Calvo and Reinhart (2000) the low observed degree of exchange rate 
variability is not due to the absence of asymmetric shocks in the emerging countries but - 5 - 
 
to monetary policies aimed at stabilizing the exchange rate.
2 Interest rate policies seem to 
have replaced ineffective foreign reserve interventions in this respect. This context might 
be circumscribed by the defense effect of interest rate policy. Hence, interest rate 
volatility should be observed to increase when exchange rate volatility is dampened
3. 
The Calvo and Reinhart argument holds if there is a national monetary policy that 
influences both prices for currency and for money itself. 
It might be argued that Calvo and Reinhart (2000) as well as Reinhart and Reinhart 
(2001) more or less make use of the old and common argument against reducing 
exchange rate variability that volatility must have a valve somewhere else. In other 
words, could the gains from suppressing exchange rate variability get lost if the 
volatility reappears elsewhere, for example in higher interest rate variability? 
We would argue that recent research on OECD economies is suggestive in this 
respect. Seen on the whole, the existing literature is skeptical about the “squeeze the 
balloon” theory, i. e. a trade-off between exchange rate volatility and the volatility of 
other variables. Rose (1996), for example, shows that official action can reduce 
exchange rate variability even holding constant the variability of fundamentals such as 
interest rates and money. Co-ordination between the Fed and the ECB could thus keep 
the dollar-euro volatility under control. This view is supported by the results of Flood 
and Rose (1995) who show that there is no clear trade-off between exchange rate 
volatility and macroeconomic stability. Furthermore, Jeanne and Rose (1999) develop 
a model of a foreign exchange market with an endogenous number of noise traders 
                                                           
2 On the contrary, the terms of trade in most of the emerging market economies are subject to larger 
and more frequent shocks than their counterparts in the G-3. This appears intuitive given the large 
share of primary commodities in their exports. 
3 Calvo and Reinhart (2000) e. g. found that the probability of a monthly interest rate change of less 
than plus/minus 2.5 percents was only 11.1 percent in Brazil (during the real managed floating period, 
1994 to 1999), only 14.3 percent in currency board Argentina while it was slightly below/above 60 
percent in the U. S. and Japan in the aftermath of Bretton Woods. - 6 - 
 
and multiple equilibria of high and low exchange rate volatility. In their model 
monetary policy can be used to lower exchange rate volatility without affecting 
macroeconomic fundamentals. Similarly, Canzoneri et al. (1996) show, e. g., for some 
G-3 countries that exchange rates do not generally move in the direction one would 
expect if they were to offset shocks. Flood and Jeanne (2000) show that in an 
extended Krugman-Flood-Garber model, raising interest rates has ambiguous effects 
on exchange rate behavior. On the one hand, higher interest rates make domestic 
assets more attractive while they damage credibility on the other hand what thus could 
lead to a weaker domestic currency – especially in case of underlying fiscal fragility. 
From our point of view, credibility is a very important influence factor in the 
development of both exchange rates and interest rates. Thus, both variables might be 
driven by other factors that influence the credibility of a country (e. g. one might 
suppose that in case of emerging markets, the link between exchange rates and 
interest rates could be affected by capital flows, country risks, or the rates of money 
growth) and therefore will move similarly. We call this credibility approach. 
But the question how exchange rate and interest rate volatility do move in emerging 
markets is not yet fully described in the literature. On the basis of the Reinhart and 
Reinhart argument (higher exchange rate volatility could lead to a negative economic 
performance in the industrialized countries that finally ends up in more volatile 
interest rates), one could also argue that bigger fluctuations between the prices of 
emerging markets’ currencies (towards G-3 currencies) lead to an unsound economic 
performance in the emerging markets itself (with larger indebtedness and especially 
lower investor confidence) what finally ends up in a more expensive access to 
international capital in the form of higher interest rate differentials. - 7 - 
 
In this paper we examine whether the view of an existing volatility trade-off is correct 
for the Mercosur countries. One point of departure for our study could be the 
consideration that there might be other variables that drive exchange rates as well as 
interest rates. If existing, these could be emerging market specific influences that 
outshine national exchange rate and interest rate specific parameters (e. g. national 
monetary and fiscal policy, government performance, or economic growth). 
3.  Theoretical Framework – the Connection between Exchange Rate 
Volatility and Interest Rate Volatility 
Calvo and Reinhart (2000) use a simple version of a conventional monetary model 
where exchange rates are driven by money supply and expectations. Applied on the 
emerging market case where a currency depreciation occurs, a policymaker will face 
the dilemma that he could either jack up money supply (what could end up in even 
lower credibility and worse expectations) or he could face the real interest rate 
increasing (what could mean disturbances in both financial and real sectors). Calvo 
and Reinhart (2000) argue that a policymaker faced with the choice between exchange 
rate stabilization and interest rate stabilization would probably opt for stable external 
prices. 
Another way of modeling the behavior of exchange rates and interest rates in 
emerging markets could be a simple Mundell Fleming approach. The Mundell 
Fleming model can describe both a small open economy that suffers or profits from 
foreign influences and a two-country case. For an emerging market, the small open 
economy case looks more valuable. But from our point of view, the Mundell Fleming 
world disposes of a weakness that we cannot cope with: In a standard model with 
rigid prices, an appreciation affects the economy in a contractionary way while a 
depreciation has expansionary effects. This would make us argue that emerging - 8 - 
 
markets’ policymakers would be reluctant to appreciations but not to depreciations. 
Thus, they would not be stability-oriented. According to this, a Mundell Fleming 
model would leave out most of the Calvo and Reinhart (2000) arguments for “fear of 
floating” and therefore is not valuable for our purposes. 
Like Calvo and Reinhart (2000), Lahiri and Végh (2001) observe a concrete 
reluctance to large exchange rate swings. They also find lower exchange rate volatility 
and higher reserve volatility in emerging than in industrialized countries. But unlike 
Calvo and Reinhart (2000), they detect from an observed positive correlation between 
changes in the exchange rate and interest rate that the interest rate probably may not 
act as a defender of a certain exchange rate. 
The key effects of a certain interest rate policy in the Lahiri and Végh (2001) model 
are: First, an increase in the interest rate of government bonds urges commercial 
banks to allow lending only in case the received interest rate there climbs in the same 
amount as governmental interest rates did. In other words: A rise in governmental 
interest rates leads also to a rise in lending interest rates. Thus, bank credit is reduced 
and output contracts. Lahiri and Végh (2001) call this the output effect of a certain 
interest rate policy. Second, due to the higher competition on the financial market, 
banks are urged to pay also higher rates on bank deposits. Therefore, demand for bank 
deposits increases. This is described as the money demand effect. 
We have now presented two crucial considerations for volatility behavior modeling. 
We have also tried to classify the existing range of scientific work on volatility 
behavior in two groups: first, interest rates acting as a defensive policy measure to 
offset large exchange rate swings (defense approach) and second, interest rates and 
exchange rates both driven by the credibility-based factors (such as e. g. capital flows, - 9 - 
 
country risks, rates of money growth, or belief in the political system) what we have 
called credibility approach. 
At first glance, the two approaches contradict each other. But we can show that both 
cases lead to a similar behavior of exchange rates and interest rates. In case of the 
credibility approach a simultaneous movement of both variables is obvious. For the 
defense approach case, Lahiri and Végh (2001) show that even with active defense of 
the currency, a similar behavior becomes plausible. In their model, they incorporate 
an output cost of raising interest rates. Let the effects of higher interest rates be the 
two above mentioned output and money demand effect. 
In this model context, they consider both a small and a large shock to real money 
demand. In case of a small shock, the output costs entailed by the resulting currency 
depreciation will also be small. Therefore, as Lahiri and Végh assume, policymakers 
should not intervene. Instead, they should partly offset the shock to money demand by 
raising domestic interest rates. It might be argued thus, that in case of a small shock 
exchange rates and interest rates move in the same direction. 
If there occurs a large shock, the supposed exchange rate fluctuations would cause too 
large output costs so that policymakers probably would intervene and try to stabilize 
the exchange rate completely. But in this case, there is no more need to change 
interest rates. Hence, exchange rates and interest rates move in a similar manner. 
According to Lahiri and Végh, the model predicts a positive correlation between 
exchange rate and interest rates. 
To summarize our theoretical framework, we argue that both exchange rates and 
interest rates in emerging markets might be driven by politics (as argued in Calvo and 
Reinhart (2000), in Lahiri and Végh (2001), and Flood and Jeanne (2000) among - 10 - 
 
others). The rationale for this is the intention of policymakers to influence specific 
economic variables (inflation, capital inflows, exchange rates or interest rates) for a 
certain motive. As it is not the intention of this contribution to identify theoretically 
the triggers of exchange rate and interest rate movements, we also provide for the 
influence of credibility in both variables by defining a “credibility approach” (also 
argued in Calvo and Reinhart (2000) or in Reinhart and Reinhart (2001)). Thus, both 
variables are market driven.  
Both theoretical backgrounds predict an analog behavior of exchange rates and 
interest rates in the first moments in most cases. This builds a testable hypothesis that 
will be further examined in the following section. 
4.  The link between exchange rate and interest rate volatility 
We test empirically whether both volatilities in the Southern cone show a co-
movement or a trade-off. Our results are based on estimated correlation coefficients. 
As a final step, we test for third variables which if significant and, hence, relevant 
could severely limit the scope for conclusions. Section 4.1 explains our measures of 
volatility. Section 4.2 presents some simple tests of the significance and of the sign of 
the correlation between the relevant volatility measures. Section 5 checks whether 
these first results are robust with respect to the consideration of potential third 
variables. Section 6 draws the implications of the results for the debate on the suitable 
exchange rate regime for the Southern Cone. 
4.1 The operational definitions of volatilities 
After having stated what the empirical exercise is all about, we now proceed to the 
second practical issue: How should one measure exchange rate and interest rate 
variability? Let us first define our measures of exchange rate and interest rate - 11 - 
 
variability which are relevant for Mercosur countries. We used a very simple measure: 
for each year of our total sample from 1970 to 2001 we calculated a standard 
deviation on the basis of twelve monthly observations of the first difference of the 
respective exchange rate and interest rate measure. In order to take into account the 
closer ties to the EU than to the U.S. as a special pattern of Mercosur foreign trade 
relationships (see section 2), we also include the volatilities of the euro exchange rates 
of the Argentine peso, of the Brazilian real, and of the Uruguayan peso. However, 
extra calculations show that the correlation between dollar and euro volatilities of the 
respective home currencies amount close to 99 percent for Argentina and Brazil, as 
could have been expected. Finally, like Reinhart and Reinhart 2001 we include real 
euro-dollar exchange rate volatility. Besides, we also utilize nominal euro-dollar 
exchange rate volatility as results may significantly differ. Since over a short-term 
horizon nominal and real exchange rates are usually highly correlated, their 
correlation should be quite high – at least in theory. Thus, our empirical research will 
clarify whether it matters or not to focus on the relationship only in one of the two 
cases. 
At this stage, it is useful to illustrate the exact definitions of the exchange rate and 
interest rate volatility variables based on the example of Argentina. Here, we consider 
the volatility of the nominal and real exchange rate vis-à-vis the US-dollar ςe
AR, US and 
ςq
AR, US, of the nominal and real exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro ςe
AR, EU and ςq
AR, EU, of 
the nominal and real dollar-exchange rate of the euro ςe
US, EU and ςq
US, EU, of the real 
effective exchange rate ςQ
AR, and of the nominal and real effective intra-Mercosur 
exchange rate ςE
AR, MERCOSUR and ςQ
AR, MERCOSUR. The volatility of the nominal short-term - 12 - 
 
interest rate is called ςR
AR, the one of real interest rate volatility ςRR
AR.
4 In Figures 1 to 3, 
some examples of our volatility measures are displayed graphically.  
- Figures 1 to 3 about here - 
Due to the specific sequencing of exchange rate regimes in each of the Mercosur 
countries, it seems to be useful to split the total sample up into different sub-samples to 
check the results for robustness.  
What kind of exchange rates did we take as the basis for our calculations? To measure 
volatility of the Mercosur currencies themselves, we used both the nominal and real 
bilateral US-dollar rates and the real effective exchange rates of the Mercosur 
currencies. Following the hypothesis by Reinhart and Reinhart (2001) who state that it 
is G-3 volatility which matters for the real sector of emerging markets (especially 
those with a peg to a G-3 currency), we use the nominal and real bilateral exchange 
rate of the US-dollar vis-à-vis the euro area (reconstituted for the past) and the 
effective rates of the dollar and the euro. In order to have percentage changes we 
either used directly the first difference of the raw numbers for the exchange rates 
when they are indices, with a base around 100. In the case of the remaining rates we 
used the first difference of the natural logarithm. The historical series of the external 
effective exchange rate of the euro area was taken directly from the official sources, 
which calculate the average of bilateral exchange rates of the 11 present euro 
countries, with weights given by the non-euro trading partners
5.  
                                                           
4 We used money market rates as a proxy for the short-term interest rate in the cases of Brazil and the 
euro zone. For the U.S., we focus on the treasury bill rate. However, for Argentina, Uruguay and 
Paraguay, we preferred the deposit rate because this enables us to use a by far larger data set (starting in 
march 1977 instead of March 1979 in the case of Argentina, in November 1992 instead of July 1999 in 
the case of Paraguay, and in July 1976 instead of December 1991 in the case of Uruguay). 
5 A description of the algorithm for the construction of the volatility variables (ς ...) can be found in 
Belke and Gros (2002a). - 13 - 
 
We use monthly exchange rates to calculate volatility instead of daily (or other higher 
frequency) volatility because the required data were easier to obtain on a consistent basis 
for the entire sample period. Another reason to prefer this measure over more short-term 
alternatives (e. g., daily variability) was that we are convinced that while the latter might 
be important for financial actors it is less relevant for decisions whether to employ or to 
invest, which have a longer time horizon. The drawback of this decision was that we had 
to use annual data in order to have a meaningful measure of variability. We thus had 
only about 31 observations for each country, which turned out to be sufficient. 
In principle one could have used option prices to extract implicit forward looking 
volatilities, but option prices are generally available only for the US dollar and 
sometimes against the DM (the euro), and even then only for limited periods. Hence, it 
would not have been possible to construct a measure of euro volatility on a consistent 
basis using option prices. We used actual exchange rate changes instead of only 
unanticipated ones. But at the monthly horizon the anticipated change is usually close to 
zero. That’s why actual and unanticipated changes should have the same results. An 
advantage of using monthly data is that price indices are available on a monthly basis so 
that one could use real exchange rates.  
Concerning our measure of interest rate volatility we apply an analogous procedure. In 
most cases (Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay) we refer to the deposit rate. In the case of 
Brazil, we use the money market rate; for the euro zone we choose the German money 
market rate until December 1994 and from January on the 3-month rate. Finally, the U.S. 
interest rate is approximated by the treasury bill rate. Real interest rates are deflated with 
the respective consumer price index (see annex). When calculating the relevant 
volatilities for the euro-dollar relationship, we used the interest rate differential instead of 
the interest rate levels in this case, because it is not ex ante obvious whether, e. g. the - 14 - 
 
U.S. interest rate is exogenous to the euro interest rate (as it might be presumed for the 
U.S. interest rate with respect to, e. g., Argentina). 
Our theoretical and empirical approach is related to, but not identical to the work of 
Reinhart and Reinhart (2001) as well as Calvo and Reinhart (2000a). These authors 
speak of volatility, but discuss in reality the impact of changes in the first moments 
(levels) of the G-3 exchange rates on “innocent bystanders”, like Mercosur countries. In 
our contribution, we look only at the second statistical moment. However, it seems to be 
extremely important to note that the model for a negative relationship between G-3 
exchange rate and interest (or monetary aggregate) volatility developed by Reinhart and 
Reinhart (2001), pp. 5 ff., is not exactly based on our measure of volatility. But their 
measure is more closely linked to ours than to the first moment of exchange rate and 
interest rate changes which are also often used in this context. See for this also Calvo and 
Reinhart (2000), pp. 13 ff. As a proxy for exchange rate volatility, they use the frequency 
distribution of monthly exchange rates (in percent) based on certain threshold values. It 
immediately becomes clear that their measure is rather close to ours or even only a 
monotonous transformation since the mean of the monthly change of monthly exchange 
or interest rates can be interpreted as a threshold for the actual changes in the framework 
of our standard deviation measure as well. This is surprisingly analogous to the threshold 
values used by Reinhart and Reinhart (2001) and Calvo and Reinhart (2000).  
The average variability (standard deviations) of the nominal dollar exchange rate of 
the ARP was 7.32 % for the whole period, that of the BRR, the PYG, and the URP 
was much lower at 3.69, 2.11, and 2.52 %.
6 Also in nominal terms, interest rate 
                                                           
6 However, one has to be cautious because this measure calculated over the whole available sample 
includes, e. g., for Argentina such different periods like the period of extreme exchange rate instability 
like 1989/90 and the currency board phase in the nineties. Hence, sample splits are highly indicated 
here. - 15 - 
 
variability usually moves around an aberrant 31.87 % for Argentina, 28 % for Brazil, 
11 % for Paraguay, and 4.57 % for Uruguay. Calculating real exchange rate 
variability makes more sense in principle and is much lower than the nominal one for 
each Mercosur country (6.38 % for Argentina, 2.54 % for Brazil).  
4.2 Evidence from simple tests of the volatility trade-off 
In the following, we present some simple tests of the significance and of the sign of 
the correlation between the relevant volatility measures. More specific, we expect a 
negative sign if there is a trade-off between two volatilities and a positive sign if there 
is a co-movement of volatilities.  
The estimated correlations between our measures of exchange rate and interest rate 
variability are shown in Tables 1a to 1c below. Note that these tables display the 
correlation coefficients (Bravais, Pearson) in percent. Are the correlation coefficients 
significant? Under the assumption that both variables are (commonly) normally 
distributed, the (one-sided) test-statistics  ( ) 2 ) . . 1 / . . (
2 − ⋅ − N coef cor coef cor  may be used for 
a tentative answer. The latter is student-t-distributed with N-2 degrees of freedom (N 
= numbers of observation). As corresponding calculations immediately reveal, the 
lowest empirical realization of this test statistics (Table 1a) amounts to 1.53 for 
Argentina which is still significant on the ten percent level, whereas the relevant test 
statistics especially for Uruguay, but also in some cases for Brazil and Paraguay are 
not significant on the usual significance levels. 
Starting from our total sample from 1970 to 2001, we compute each of the second 
moments for the Bravais Pearson correlation coefficient, using all non-missing 
observations for the relevant series. Hence, we use the maximum number of 
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observations for our unbalanced sample. In the case of Argentina, we additionally 
limited the sample to the period from 1981 on, taking the transition from pre-
announced sliding peg (“tablita”) to floating exchange rate into account. Finally, we 
limited the sample to annual data from 1991 on. By this, we operationalize 
Argentina’s transition from different attempts to fix or to control the exchange rate 
(Alfonsín and Menem) to the convertibility plan. In the case of Brazil, we introduced 
a sample split for the year 1994 (real plan). For Paraguay, reliable data were only 
available from 1990 on, i.e., after the transition to flexible exchange rates. For 
Uruguay, no sample split seems to be indicated according to our above 
considerations.
7 
- Tables 1a and 1b about here - 
According to Table 1c, the correlation coefficient of the nominal dollar-euro exchange 
rate variability (ςe
US, EU) and the variability of euro zone-U.S. nominal interest 
differential (ςRDif
EU, US) (from 1978 on due to availability of ςe
US, EU) is 0.13. The 
correlation coefficient of real dollar-euro exchange rate variability and variability of 
euro zone-U.S. real interest differential (from 1978 on due to availability of ςe
US, EU) 
amounts to 0.19. Finally, the coefficients of correlation between the volatilities of the 
euro zone and the U.S. real effective exchange rate and the variability of euro zone-
U.S. real interest differential are –0.03 and –0.18 respectively. However, none of 
them is significant. 
- Table 1c about here - 
                                                           
7 As a robustness check, we calculated the correlation coefficients based on breaks in 1981, 1989, 1991, 
and 1994 for all countries of the sample under investigation here. The outcome did not change the 
general pattern of results displayed above. 
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The general picture emerging from these correlation exercises is the following. For 
countries subject to speculative attacks and/or bouts of hyperinflation exchange rate 
and interest rate volatility move together. The case of Argentina is remarkable in this 
respect where both volatilities nearly move one-to-one. Even during calmer periods 
(either of a currency board that is perceived to be credible, or of a floating exchange 
rate regime with inflation under control) the relationship is tight as both variables 
seem to be driven by a country’s ability to access international capital markets. 
However, the experience of Argentina has reinforced once more the lesson that calmer 
periods will last only if the underlying arrangement is stable. Hence, nothing assures 
that pegging the Argentine peso to the dollar will automatically lead to calm periods, 
smoothing the movements in the interest rates. The last three years of the currency 
board provide evidence on this. The contrary applies for the major floating exchange 
rates. As shown in tables 1a to 1c, dollar (or euro) volatility is not systematically 
related to interest rate volatility (this holds irrespectively of whether one uses the 
volatility of dollar interest rates, or that of interest rate differentials dollar-euro).  
The fact that the real exchange rate indices are somewhat less variable than the 
nominal ones (at least for the South American currencies considered here) just 
confirms that exchange rates during high inflation periods, even in the short run, do 
move to somewhat offset price developments. Our approach is related to, but not 
identical to the work of Reinhart and Reinhart (2001) as well as Calvo and Reinhart 
(2000a). These authors speak of volatility, but discuss in reality the impact of changes 
in the first moments (levels) of the G-3 exchange rates on “innocent bystanders”, like 
Mercosur countries. We look only at the second moment. Table 1a suggests that a 
higher variability of the dollar/euro exchange rate is not strongly correlated with 
interest rate volatility in Mercosur (correlation coefficients of 0.29 and -0.16 - 18 - 
 
respectively for Argentina and Brazil). As for Mercosur, i. e. for Argentina and Brazil, 
interest rate volatility is almost the same as exchange rate volatility. This implies that 
dollar/euro volatility is also not strongly correlated with volatility of the Mercosur 
currencies. Just to repeat: we are comparing and correlating second moments. Even if 
they are not correlated it can still remain true that a weak euro creates difficulties for 
Argentina when it is pegged to the dollar. 
5.  “Third” missing variables as additional arguments? 
So far, we have identified a positive association between both volatility measures. As 
a final step, we now extend the empirical section to check whether it is necessary to 
include multivariate analysis. Correcting for other determinants of the exchange rate 
may shed more light on how viable the positive association between the volatility 
variables really is.  
What other potential determinants of exchange rate volatility and interest rate 
volatility might be considered here? In section 5.1, we focus our investigations on the 
real sector variables employment, unemployment and real investment as potential 
fundamentals driving exchange rate volatility and interest rate volatility. At the same 
time, these variables typically affect the expected level of the exchange rate and, 
hence, may serve as a proxy for the expected exchange rate in our investigations. In 
section 5.2, we relate to the level of the exchange rate and the level of the real interest 
rate as the potential explaining variables behind the volatilities. In section 5.3, we test 
explicitly whether the respective volatilities are driven by domestic monetary 
volatility. According to all experience with emerging markets, the rate of money - 19 - 
 
growth is one of those variables which typically affect the level of country risk.
8 In 
each section, we give reasons for the choice of these robustness check variables in 
detail. 
5.1 Exogeneity of volatility variables with respect to real economy? 
Former investigations by the authors suggest that exchange rate variability (whether 
extra- or intra-Mercosur) and interest rate variability have had a statistically significant 
negative impact on employment and investment for those Southern Cone countries 
investigated in this contribution (Belke and Gros 2002, 2002a). This piece of evidence, 
taken by itself, is a possible objection against these results, since in our former 
investigations exchange rate variability and interest rate volatility influence real variables 
with a lag. Hence, reverse causation and a case for third missing variables appear less 
plausible. But even in cases of a contemporaneous relationship reverse causation appears 
not to be a problem as suggested by additional pairwise Granger causality tests which are 
applied to exchange rate and interest rate variability and three real sector variables, 
namely employment, unemployment and real investment.  
In our Granger-causality tests, the lag length l=2 corresponds to our reasonable beliefs 
about the longest time over which one of the variables could help to predict the other. 
We run bivariate pairwise regressions of the form: 
t l t l t l t l t t x x y y y ε β β α α α + + + + + + + = − − − − ... ... 1 1 1 1 0 , and 
t l t l t l t l t t u y y x x x + + + + + + + = − − − − β β α α α ... ... 1 1 1 1 0 , 
(1)  
                                                           
8 We do not consider measures of political stability in our context because these variables often move 
very slowly and, hence, are of no apparent use in empirical studies like this one which focus on 
individual countries instead of a panel of economies. - 20 - 
 
with y = volatility variable and x = robustness check variable. The reported p-values are 
the probability values of the F-statistics which for each equation corresponds to the Wald 
statistics for the joint hypothesis: 
0 ... 2 1 = = = = l β β β .  (2)  
The null hypothesis is that x does not Granger-cause y in the first regression and that y 
does not Granger-cause x in the second regression. The tables 2 and 3 each display the 
results from (11 volatility variables times 3 real sector variables =) 33 pairwise Granger 
causality tests. Let us now summarize the results. 
- Tables 2 and 3 about here - 
In case of Argentina and Brazil we are not forced to reject the hypothesis that the real 
sector variables do not Granger cause our volatility measures in 65 out of 66 cases.
9 In 
addition, there are also some other arguments which speak in favor of our exogeneity 
hypothesis for the volatility variables. We are skeptical in general about the possibility 
that exchange rate and interest rate variability at our high frequency was caused by 
slow moving variables such as labor market rigidities or unemployment and 
investment. A further argument validating our methodology and our results comes 
from the work of Canzoneri, Vallés and Viñals (1996) and others who show for a 
different sample of countries that exchange rates reacted mainly to financial shocks 
rather than real fundamentals. Hence, financial variables remain the main suspects 
with respect to the question whether there are still some determinants of exchange rate 
volatility which have not been considered here. Rose (1996) and Flood and Rose 
(1995) also emphasize that exchange rate volatility is largely noise. It does not make 
                                                           
9 However, based on former estimates (Belke and Gros (2002a), pp. 41 f.) we do in the overwhelming 
majority of cases reject the hypothesis that our volatility measures do not “cause” the three real sector 
variables. Therefore it appears that “causality” runs from volatility to the real sector and not the other 
way around. - 21 - 
 
much sense to treat a noise series as endogenous. Seen on the whole, this fosters our 
theoretical background. 
Let us now turn to the second group of variables suspect of being neglected in our 
interpretation of the simple correlation coefficients in section 4, namely other 
financial variables. In order to be legitimized to neglect them in our empirical 
correlation analysis, we have to test and not to reject empirically that our volatility 
variables are exogenous with respect to these financial variables. We do this in the 
following section. 
5.2 Exogeneity of volatility with respect to financial variables? 
The purpose of the following is to report the results of some tests for the robustness of 
the relationships found so far. We try to take into account the two most plausible ways 
in which our measures of exchange rate and interest rate variability could stand for 
some other variable. For each hypothesis we then implement the same Granger 
causality test procedure as described in section 5.1.  
The two hypotheses we consider are: 
i) Exchange rate variability is just a sign of a misalignment (i.e. a wrong level of the 
exchange rate). 
ii) Interest rate variability just reflects the financial stress defined as high real (short-
term) interest rates.  
ad i) A first possible caveat might be that this volatility just stands for misalignments 
of the real exchange rate. Mercosur currencies were usually variable when they were 
very weak. But this argument needs to be addressed because it is claimed that 
devaluations are contractionary. - 22 - 
 
ad ii) Interest rate variability could also just be the result of a tight monetary policy. 
However, this problem of identification can be reduced by explicitly by considering a 
variable that indicates the degree of tightness. We use the (real) interest rate as a first 
tentative indicator.  
In order to take these hypotheses into account, we added the first difference (the level is 
not stationary) of the exchange rate in the Granger causality regressions displayed in the 
tables 4 and 5, if the implemented volatility measure is one for exchange rate variability. 
In contrast, if an interest rate volatility measure enters the regression equation, the 
change in the respective interest rate (again, the level is non-stationary) is inserted in the 
Granger causality test equations. On the whole, these tests (tables 4 and 5) confirm that 
our correlation results are not spurious so that we can still assume that volatilities are 
driven by factors such as market confidence and politics. 
- Tables 4 and 5 about here - 
5.3 Is volatility caused by monetary influences? 
We also enacted some preliminary statistical analysis to investigate whether interest rate 
volatility and exchange rate volatility are driven by (in case of exchange rate volatility, 
relative) domestic monetary volatility.
10 For this purpose, we calculated the relevant 
correlation matrices like in section 4 (figures 4 and 5) and again conducted a Granger 
causality analysis (tables 6 and 7). In the first two rows we ask whether domestic 
monetary policy volatility (volatility of M1 Argentina respectively the volatility of 
monetary base Brazil) does systematically ‘cause’ interest rate volatility in Argentina 
and Brazil. The second two rows refer to the test whether domestic monetary policy 
volatility relative to the U.S. does ‘cause’ exchange rate volatility in Argentina and 
                                                           
10 Like all the other volatility measures used here, volatility is again defined as described in the annex 
of Belke and Gros (2002a). - 23 - 
 
Brazil. However, the availability of data was limited to the time span 1980 to 2000. 
Table 6 includes Argentina’s currency board period because otherwise the estimates 
might have been unreliable due to the low number of observations. Alternatively, in 
Table 7 we only refer to tests based on a sample excluding Argentina’s currency board 
period. The drawback in this case is that we have only few numbers of observations 
available and the results maybe not reliable. The notations are as before.  
- Figures 4 and 5 about here - 
- Tables 6 and 7 about here - 
The main results of our preliminary analysis are as follows. First, we find a high 
correlation between domestic monetary policy volatility and interest rate volatility, and, 
second, a high correlation between exchange rate volatility and relative monetary 
policies in the case of Argentina. However, the results seem to indicate that this 
correlation cannot be interpreted in the sense of a causal relationship. This emphasizes 
again our confidence that both volatilities are driven either by politics or by international 
financial markets. For a closer view, further research will be necessary. 
Hence, these questions of what is driving the volatilities of the exchange rates and the 
interest rates cannot finally be answered within this paper. Our main finding is that 
correcting for important potential determinants of the exchange rate cannot help to 
establish the conditions under which the suggested positive association is viable. Since 
our results based on estimated correlation coefficients appear to be robust with respect to 
the consideration of potential third variables, we do not feel that our scope for 
conclusions is severely limited. On the contrary, we are rather confident in concluding 
that there is – in contrast, e. g., to the US and the euro area – no volatility trade-off in the 
Southern Cone. - 24 - 
 
6.  Conclusions 
Our contribution examines the interrelation between exchange rate volatility and 
interest rate volatility in Mercosur countries. Our findings can be summarized to three 
major points: 
First, other than authors like Calvo and Reinhart (2000), for the Mercosur we cannot 
detect a trade-off between both variables. Instead, the data from the past suggest that 
there is a statistically co-movement of exchange rate and interest rate volatilities in the 
Southern Cone. This goes very much in line with our theoretical framework that 
provided us with a testable thesis of co-movement. 
This result stands in sharp contrast to our results for the euro area and the US. Hence, 
we conclude that countries like Argentina or Brazil are able to realize not only lower 
interest rates (due to a lower exchange rate risk) but also lower interest rate volatility 
when they peg their currency to a stable external anchor. 
Second, with an eye on the model in section 3 and backed by the data, we conclude that 
exchange rates are driven by different factors for Mercosur countries than for 
industrialized countries. This might seem obvious, but it has important implications. Our 
model predicts that Argentinean and Brazilian exchange rates are largely influenced by 
confidence (in the ability to serve external debt and the solidity of domestic political 
institutions) and the solidity of domestic political institutions. Although we do not test 
directly the influence of both factors on the volatilities we can reject the influence of 
several other macro variables on exchange rates and interest rates. Identifying some 
additional determinants of exchange rate volatility, other than interest rate volatility, 
would have allowed us to establish the conditions under which a positive association 
between exchange rate and interest rate volatility holds. However, according to our - 25 - 
 
robustness checks all variables under suspect finally proved to be variables to which 
exchange rate and interest rate variability in the Mercosur are clearly exogenous.  
In this contribution, we approximate the country risk of emerging markets by the rate 
of money growth. However, we can think of other variables which typically also 
affect the level of country risk, like for instance capital flows, debt to GDP ratios and 
measures of political stability. Their explicit inclusion in the analysis of the volatility 
trade-off is left for future research which should then rely on a panel analysis. 
Third, another fact here is the different behavior of real and nominal volatilities. As 
mentioned in section 4, theory would suggest that both variables should move similarly 
as we have stressed credibility to be a major influence factor in exchange rate and 
interest rate behavior. This, in turn, would make either nominal or real variables 
redundant for our analysis. In fact, our investigations expose partly deviations between 
real and nominal variables. We do not examine this in more detail – also leaving here 
space for future research. Anyway, a possible explanation might be “pricing to market” 
behavior that makes real and nominal exchange rates behave differently.  - 26 - 
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Annex 
1.  Data – variable definitions 
 
The following variables have been utilized: 
M  money supply  RR  real interest rate 
P price  level  ς volatility 
e  nominal exchange rate  L  employment 
E  nominal effective exchange rate  l  employment rate 
q  real exchange rate  u  unemployment rate 
Q  real effective exchange rate  I  investment 
R nominal  interest  rate II  real  investment 
The country is noted in the variable’s exponent, further explanations are made in the 
variable’s basis. 
 
Nominal bilateral exchange rates: 
e
AR, US  Nominal exchange rate Argentinean Peso to U.S. Dollar: 
IMF – Statistical Yearbook and various Monthly Reports. 
e
BR, US  Nominal exchange rate Brazilian Real to U.S. Dollar: 
IMF – Statistical Yearbook and various Monthly Reports. 
e
PY, US  Nominal exchange rate Paraguayan Guarani to U.S. Dollar: 
IMF – Statistical Yearbook and various Monthly Reports. 
e
UY, US  Nominal exchange rate Uruguayan Peso to U.S. Dollar: 
Banco Central del Uruguay (until June 1973) and IMF – Statistical Yearbook and various 
Monthly Reports (from July 1973 on). 
e
US, EU  Nominal exchange rate Euro to U.S. Dollar: 
period average, Source: IMF – Statistical Yearbook and various Monthly Reports, IFS (IMF) 
series 111..EB.ZF... . 
The remaining bilateral nom. exchange rate time series were created via cross-rates. 
de
US, EU  Growth rate of the nominal exchange rate Euro to U.S. dollar: 
= D(LOG(e
US, EU))*100. 
The remaining growth rates are constructed analogously. 
 
Nominal effective exchange rates: 
E
EU  Nominal effective exchange rate of the euro: 
Source: IFS (IMF) series 163..NEUZF... 
E
PY  Nominal effective exchange rate of the Paraguayan Guarani: 
Source: IFS (IMF) series. 
E
US  Nominal effective exchange rate of the U.S. dollar: 
based on unit labor costs, Source: IFS (IMF) series 111..NEUZF... . 
E
UY  Nominal effective exchange rate of the Uruguayan Peso: 
Source: IFS (IMF) series. 
 
Real effective exchange rates: 
Q
AR  Real effective exchange rate of the Argentinean Peso: 
Monthly data: = 4.739*q
AR, JP +22.058*q
AR, US +35.402*q
AR, EU + 35.004*q
AR, BR +2.797*q
AR, UY 
(weights from Center for Global Trade Analysis (2001): GTAP 5: exports + imports). Annual 
data: Real effective exchange rate Argentina in terms of import prices, Source: Comisión 
Económica para América Latina y el Caribe 




BR  Real effective exchange rate of the Brazilian Real: 
Monthly data: = 8.258*q
BR, JP +31.974*q
BR, US +41.362*q
BR, EU + 16.431* 
(1/q
AR, BR)+1.974*q
BR, UY (weights from Center for Global Trade Analysis (2001): GTAP 5: 
exports + imports).Annual data: Real effective exchange rate Brazil in terms of import prices, 
Source: Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe 
http://www.eclac.org//publicaciones/DesarrolloEconomico. 
Q
EU  Real effective exchange rate of the euro: 
based on unit labor costs, Source: IFS (IMF), series 163..REUZF... . 
Q
PY  Real effective exchange rate of the Paraguayan Guarani: 
based on relative CPI, Source: IMF – Statistical Yearbook and various Monthly Reports. 
Q
US  Real effective exchange rate of the U.S. dollar: 
based on unit labor costs, Source: IFS (IMF) series 111..REUZF... . 
Q
UY  Real effective exchange rate of the Uruguayan Peso: 
based on relative CPI, Source: IMF – Statistical Yearbook and various Monthly Reports. 
 
Exchange rate volatility: 
ςE




















AR, Mercosur  Volatility of the real Argentinean Peso exchange rate towards the other Mercosur 
currencies: 
= 0.926* ςq
AR, BR + 0.074* ςq
AR, UY. 
ςQ
BR, Mercosur  Volatility of the real Brazilian Real exchange rate towards the other Mercosur currencies: 
= 0.8927* ςq
AR, BR + 0.1073* ςq
BR, UY. 
ςQ
UY, Mercosur  Volatility of the real Uruguayan Peso exchange rate towards the other Mercosur 
currencies: 
= 0.60* ςq
BR, UY + 0.40* ςq
AR, UY. 
ςE
AR, Mercosur  Volatility of the nominal Argentinean Peso exchange rate towards the other Mercosur 
currencies: 
= 0.926* ςe
AR, BR + 0.074* ςe
AR, UY. 
ςE
BR, Mercosur  Volatility of the nominal Brazilian Real exchange rate towards the other Mercosur 
currencies: 
= 0.8927* ςe
AR, BR + 0.1073* ςe
BR, UY. 
ςE
UY, Mercosur  Volatility of the nominal Uruguayan Peso exchange rate towards the other Mercosur 
currencies: 
= 0.60* ςe
BR, UY + 0.40* ςe
AR, UY. 
Weights = exports plus imports weights from Center for Global Trade Analysis 2001 





AR  Nominal interest rate Argentina: 
Deposit Rate (in home curreny), Source: IFS (IMF) series 21360L..ZF... 
R
BR  Nominal interest rate Brazil: 
Money Market Rate (in home currency), Source: IFS (IMF) series 22360B..ZF... . 
R
PY  Nominal interest rate Paraguay: 
Deposit Rate (in home currency), Source: IFS (IMF) series. 
R
UY  Nominal interest rate Uruguay: 
Deposit Rate (in home currency), Source: IFS (IMF) series. - III - 
 
R
EU  Nominal interest rate euro zone: 
until December 1994: German money market rate, Source: Bundesbank; from January 1995 
on: 3-month rate, Source: ECB, Monthly Reports. 
R
US  Nominal interest rate U.S.: 
treasury bill rate, Source: Federal Reserve Bank. 
RDif
EU, US  Euro zone-U.S. nominal interest differential 
RR
AR  Real interest rate Argentina: 
R
AR deflated by the consumer price index. 
RR
BR  Real interest rate Brazil: 
R
BR deflated by the consumer price index. 
RR
PY  Real interest rate Paraguay: 
R
PY deflated by the consumer price index. 
RR
UY  Real interest rate Uruguay: 
R
UY deflated by the consumer price index. 
RR
EU  Real interest rate euro zone: 
R
EU deflated by the consumer price index. 
RR
US  Real interest rate U.S.: 
R
US deflated by the consumer price index. 
 
Interest rate volatility: 
ςR








EU, US  Variability of euro zone-U.S. nominal interest differential 
based on RDif
EU, US 




AR  Price Level Argentina: 
Consumer Price Index Argentina (1995=100), Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y 
Censos, (http://www.indec.mecon.gov.ar). 
P
BR  Price Level Brazil: 
Consumer Price Index Brazil (1995=100), Source: IFS (IMF) series CPI (22364...ZF...) + IMF – 
Statistical Yearbook and various Monthly Reports. 
P
EU  Price Level euro zone: 
Consumer Price Index (1995=100), Source: until December 1994 Bundesbank, from January 
1995 on ECB. 
P
PY  Price Level Paraguay: 
Consumer Price Index Paraguay (1995=100), Source: IFS (IMF) series CPI (22364...ZF...) + 
IMF – Statistical Yearbook and various Monthly Reports and Banco Central del Paraguay (from 
September 1999 on). 
P
US  Price Level U.S.: 
Consumer Price Index (1995=100), Source: IFS (IMF) series CPI (11164...ZF...) + IMF – 
Statistical Yearbook and various Monthly Reports. 
P
UY  Price Level Uruguay: 
Consumer Price Index Uruguay (1995=100), Source: IFS (IMF) series CPI + IMF – Statistical 




AR  Investment Argentina: 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation Argentina (millions of Argentinean peso), Source: IMF Statistical 
Yearbook, IFS (IMF). 
I
BR  Investment Brazil: 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation Brazil (millions of real), Source: IMF Statistical Yearbook, IFS 




PY  Investment Paraguay: 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation Paraguay (billions of guarani), Source: IMF Statistical Yearbook, 
IFS (IMF). 
I
UY  Investment Uruguay: 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation Uruguay (millions of Urug. peso), Source: IMF Statistical 




AR  M1 Argentina: 
Source: national currency, thousands, IFS/IMF Series 21334...ZF... . 
MBase
BR  Monetary Base Brazil: 
used instead of M1 for reasons of data availability, Source: 
http://www.bancocentral.gov.br 
M1
US  M1 U.S.: 
Currency, travellers cheques, demand deposits and other checkable deposits, Source: 
Federal Reserve Bank. 
ςM1
AR  Volatility of M1 Argentina 
ςMBase
BR  Volatility of monetary base Brazil 
 
Relative monetary policy: 
MRel










AR, US  Volatility of relative monetary policy Argentina/U.S. 
ςMRel
BR, US  Volatility of relative monetary policy Brazil/U.S. 
 
Employment and employment rates 
l
AR  Employment rate Argentina: 
Evolución de la las principales variables ocupacionales (% of employed population to total 
pop.), Empleo, Tasa de Empleo en Aglomerados Urba-nos, Src: Enc. Permanente de Hogares, 
INDEC. http://www2.mecon.gov.ar/infoeco/. 
L
BR  Employment level Brazil: 
(in thousands) Persons aged 10 years and over. Excl. rural population of Rondônia, Acre, 
Amazonas, Roraima, Pará and Amapá. Sep. of each year. Prior to 1979: excl. rural areas of 
Northern Region, Mato Grosso, Goiás and Tocantins. 1992 methodology revised; data not 
strictly comparable. Source: LABORSTA (http://laborsta.ilo.org/), IFS (IMF) and 
http://www4.bcb.gov.br/series-i/default.asp. 
L
PY  Employment level Paraguay: 
(in thousands), Source: Banco Central del Paraguay, Real sector data, pobl. ocupada 
(http://www.bcp.gov.py/gee/statistic/indice.htm), see 
http://www.ine.gub.uy/mercosur/english/cuadros/mc_3_1.htm for the data consistency is 
massively hampered by different definitions of the sample, e.g., Metropolitan area of 
Asunción.(4) Urban area. (5) National total for urban and rural areas. Encuesta Permanente de 
Hogares. 
L
UY  Employment level Uruguay: 
(in thousands) urban areas, incl. professional army; excl. compulsory military service, persons 
aged 14 years and over. 1984 and 1986 first semester, aclaración importante: Hasta el año 1997 
la encuesta cubría a las localidades de 900 y más habitantes y a partie del año 1998 cubre de 
5.000 o más habitantes. Source: IFS (IMF), LABORSTA (http://laborsta.ilo.org/), Instituto 





AR  Unemployment rate Argentina: 
Evolución de la las principales variables ocupacionales (en %), Desocupación (in percent), - V - 
 
Sources: Encuesta Permanente de Hogares, INDEC. http://www2.mecon.gov.ar/infoeco/. 
u
BR  Unemployment rate Brazil: 
Unemployment rate Brazil (in percent), Taxa de Desemprego aberto – original e 
dessazonalizada – taxas medias 30 dias; Source: http://www.ibge.gov.br on the page 
“Indicadores Conjunturais” [Conjuncture Indicators] under the heading “Trabalho e 
Rendimento” [Labor and Income]: “Ajuste sazonal – taxa de desemprego” [Seasonal 
adjustment - unemployment rate]. IBGE, Diretoria de pesquisas, departamento de emprego e 
rendimento, pesquisa mensal de emprego. 
u
PY  Unemployment rate Paraguay: 
Source: Banco Central del Paraguay, Real sector data, población ocupada 
(http://www.bcp.gov.py/gee/statistic/indice.htm). 
u
UY  Unemployment rate Uruguay: 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica INE, Tasa de desempleo anual – Total País urbano y 
Por Departamento, 
http://www.ine.gub.uy/bancodedatos/ECH/ECH%20TOT%20Des%20A.xls. 
2.  Tables and Figures 
Table 1a: Correlation matrices of indicators of exchange rate and interest rate 
variability (full sample, only Paraguay from 1990 on) 











__, US  0.90*** / 0.82*** / 0.27* / 0.43** /
ςq
__, US  / 0.83*** / 0.31** / 0.24*  / 0.36*
ςe
__, EU  0.91*** / 0.80*** / 0.23* / 0.26 /
ςq
__, EU  / 0.85*** / 0.22* / 0.23*  / 0.30*
ςe
US, EU  0.29** / -0.16 / 0.05 / 0.33* /
ςq
US, EU  / 0.29* / -0.16 / -0.01  / 0.40**
ςQ
__  / 0.82*** / 0.34** / 0.15  / -0.12
ςE
__, MERCOSUR  0.85*** / 0.41*** / 0.01 / 
ςQ
__, MERCOSUR  / 0.80*** / 0.17 / 0.15 
Sample:  ςe
AR, US and ςq
AR, US from 1971 on; ςe
AR, EU and ςq
AR, EU from 1979 on; ςQ
AR from 1979 
on; ςE
AR, MERCOSUR from 1971 on; ςQ




BR, US and ςq
BR, US from 1970 on; ςe
BR, EU and ςq
BR, EU from 1979 on; ςQ
BR 
from 1979 on; ςE
BR, MERCOSUR and ςQ




UY, US and ςq
UY, US from 1970 on; ςe
UY, EU and ςq
UY, EU from 1979 on; ςQ
UY 
from 1980 on; ςE
UY, MERCOSUR and ςQ




PY, US and ςq
PY, US from 1970 on; ςe
PY, EU and ςq




PY from 1990 on; ςe
US, EU and ςq
US, EU from 1978 on. Significance 
levels are ***: 1 %; **: 5 %; *: 10 % respectively. 
Note:   __ = AR, BR, UY, PY. - VI - 
 
 
Table 1b: Correlation matrices of indicators of exchange rate and interest rate 
variability (limited samples) 
 
Argentina 
(from 1981 on) 
Argentina 
(from 1991 on) 
Brazil 









__, US  0.90*** / 0.90*** / 0.83*** /
ςq
__, US  / 0.83*** / 0.93*** / -0.07
ςe
__, EU  0.90*** / 0.90*** / 0.87*** /
ςq
__, EU  / 0.84*** / 0.94*** / -0.07
ςe
US, EU  0.26* / 0.57*** / -0.31 /
ςq
US, EU  / 0.26* / 0.61*** / -0.31
ςQ
__  / 0.82*** / 0.81*** / -0.31
ςE
__, MERCOSUR  0.84*** / 0.44** / 0.83*** /
ςQ
__, MERCOSUR  / 0.79*** / 0.52*** / -0.03
 
Table 1c: Correlation matrix of dollar-euro exchange rate volatility and variability of 
Euro zone-U.S. interest differential 
  ςe
US, EU  ςq




EU, US  0.13 / /  / 
ςRRDif
EU, US  / 0.19  -0.03  -0.18 
Sample: for all variables from 1987 on. - VII - 
 
Table 2: Exogeneity of volatility variables with respect to real economy? 
Pairwise Granger causality tests for exogeneity, Argentina (until 1990) 
Sample: 1970 1990 (lags: 2) 
Null Hypothesis:  Obs F-Statistic Probability
du
AR  does not Granger cause  ςe
AR, US  18 --------  -------- 
dl
AR  does not Granger cause  ςe
AR, US  14 --------  -------- 
dII
AR  does not Granger cause  ςe
AR, US  18 --------  -------- 
du
AR  does not Granger cause  ςq
AR, US  18 --------  -------- 
dl
AR  does not Granger cause  ςq
AR, US  14 --------  -------- 
dII
AR  does not Granger cause  ςq
AR, US  18 --------  -------- 
du
AR  does not Granger cause  ςe
AR, EU  10 --------  -------- 
dl
AR  does not Granger cause  ςe
AR, EU  10 --------  -------- 
dII
AR  does not Granger cause  ςe
AR, EU  10 --------  -------- 
du
AR  does not Granger cause  ςq
AR, EU  10 --------  -------- 
dl
AR  does not Granger cause  ςq
AR, EU  10 --------  -------- 
dII
AR  does not Granger cause  ςq
AR, EU  10 --------  -------- 
du
AR  does not Granger cause  ςe
US, EU  11 --------  -------- 
dl
AR  does not Granger cause  ςe
US, EU  11 --------  -------- 
dII
AR  does not Granger cause  ςe
US, EU  11   3.46332   0.10000 
du
AR  does not Granger cause  ςq
US, EU  11 --------  -------- 
dl
AR  does not Granger cause  ςq
US, EU  11 --------  -------- 
dII
AR  does not Granger cause  ςq
US, EU  11 --------  -------- 
du
AR  does not Granger cause  ςQ
AR  10 --------  -------- 
dl
AR  does not Granger cause  ςQ
AR  10 --------  -------- 
dII
AR  does not Granger cause  ςQ
AR  10 --------  -------- 
du
AR  does not Granger cause  ςE
AR, MERCOSUR  18 --------  -------- 
dl
AR  does not Granger cause  ςE
AR, MERCOSUR  14 --------  -------- 
dII
AR  does not Granger cause  ςE
AR, MERCOSUR  18 --------  -------- 
du
AR  does not Granger cause  ςQ
AR, MERCOSUR  18 --------  -------- 
dl
AR  does not Granger cause  ςQ
AR, MERCOSUR  14 --------  -------- 
dII
AR  does not Granger cause  ςQ
AR, MERCOSUR  18 --------  -------- 
du
AR  does not Granger cause  ςR
AR  18 --------  -------- 
dl
AR  does not Granger cause  ςR
AR  14   4.35821   0.04747 
dII
AR  does not Granger cause  ςR
AR  18 --------  -------- 
du
AR  does not Granger cause  ςRR
AR  12 --------  -------- 
dl
AR  does not Granger cause  ςRR
AR  12 --------  -------- 
dII
AR  does not Granger cause  ςRR
AR  12   4.20507   0.06317 
Note: “--------“ substitutes p-values of more than 0.10.  - VIII - 
 
Table 3: Exogeneity of volatility variables with respect to real economy? 
Pairwise Granger causality tests for exogeneity, Brazil (until 1993) 
Sample: 1970 1993 (lags: 2) 
Null Hypothesis:  Obs F-Statistic Probability
du
BR  does not Granger cause  ςe
BR, US  11 --------  -------- 
dl
BR  does not Granger cause    11 --------  -------- 
dII
BR  does not Granger cause    20 --------  -------- 
du
BR  does not Granger cause  ςq
BR, US  11 --------  -------- 
dl
BR  does not Granger cause    11 --------  -------- 
dII
BR  does not Granger cause    20 --------  -------- 
du
BR  does not Granger cause  ςe
BR, EU  10 --------  -------- 
dl
BR  does not Granger cause    10 --------  -------- 
dII
BR  does not Granger cause    13 --------  -------- 
du
BR  does not Granger cause  ςq
BR, EU  10 --------  -------- 
dl
BR  does not Granger cause    10 --------  -------- 
dII
BR  does not Granger cause    13 --------  -------- 
du
BR  does not Granger cause  ςe
US, EU  10 --------  -------- 
dl
BR  does not Granger cause    10 --------  -------- 
dII
BR  does not Granger cause    14 --------  -------- 
du
BR  does not Granger cause  ςq
US, EU  10 --------  -------- 
dl
BR  does not Granger cause    10 --------  -------- 
dII
BR  does not Granger cause    14 --------  -------- 
du
BR  does not Granger cause  ςQ
BR  10 --------  -------- 
dl
BR  does not Granger cause    10 --------  -------- 
dII
BR  does not Granger cause    13 --------  -------- 
du
BR  does not Granger cause  ςE
BR, MERCOSUR  11 --------  -------- 
dl
BR  does not Granger cause    11 --------  -------- 
dII
BR  does not Granger cause    20 --------  -------- 
du
BR  does not Granger cause  ςQ
BR, MERCOSUR  11 --------  -------- 
dl
BR  does not Granger cause    11 --------  -------- 
dII
BR  does not Granger cause    20 --------  -------- 
du
BR  does not Granger cause  ςR
BR  11 --------  -------- 
dl
BR  does not Granger cause    11 --------  -------- 
dII
BR  does not Granger cause    20 --------  -------- 
du
BR  does not Granger cause  ςRR
BR  11 --------  -------- 
dl
BR  does not Granger cause    11 --------  -------- 
dII
BR  does not Granger cause    20 --------  -------- 
Note: “--------“ substitutes p-values of more than 0.10.  - IX - 
 
Table 4: Pairwise Granger causality tests for collinearity, Argentina (until 1990) 
Sample: 1970 1990 (lags: 2) 
Null Hypothesis:  Obs F-Statistic Probability
de
US, EU  does not Granger cause  ςe
US, EU  10 --------  -------- 
dq
AR, US  does not Granger cause  ςq
AR, US  17 --------  -------- 
de
AR, EU  does not Granger cause  ςe
AR, EU  10 --------  -------- 
dq
AR, EU  does not Granger cause  ςq
AR, EU  10 --------  -------- 
de
US, EU  does not Granger cause  ςe
US, EU  10 --------  -------- 
dq
US, EU  does not Granger cause  ςq
US, EU  10 --------  -------- 
dQ
AR  does not Granger cause  ςQ
AR  10 --------  -------- 
dQ
AR, MERCOSUR  does not Granger cause  ςQ
AR, MERCOSUR  17 --------  -------- 
dE
AR, MERCOSUR  does not Granger cause  ςE
AR, MERCOSUR  17 --------  -------- 
dR
AR  does not Granger cause  ςR
AR  11 --------  -------- 
dRR
AR  does not Granger cause  ςRR
AR  11 --------  -------- 
Note: “--------“ substitutes p-values of more than 0.10.  
 
Table 5: Pairwise Granger causality tests for collinearity, Brazil (until 1993) 
Sample: 1970 1993 (lags: 2) 
Null Hypothesis:  Obs F-Statistic Probability
de
US, EU  does not Granger cause  ςe
US, EU  21 --------  0.03893 
dq
BR, US  does not Granger cause  ςq
BR, US  21 --------  -------- 
de
BR, EU  does not Granger cause  ςe
BR, EU  13 --------  0.07460 
dq
BR, EU  does not Granger cause  ςq
BR, EU  13 --------  0.07293 
de
US, EU  does not Granger cause  ςe
US, EU  13 --------  -------- 
dq
US, EU  does not Granger cause  ςq
US, EU  13 --------  -------- 
dQ
BR  does not Granger cause  ςQ
BR  13 --------  0.01132 
dQ
BR, MERCOSUR  does not Granger cause  ςQ
BR, MERCOSUR  20 --------  -------- 
dE
BR, MERCOSUR  does not Granger cause  ςE
BR, MERCOSUR  20 --------  -------- 
dR
BR  does not Granger cause  ςR
BR  21 --------  -------- 
dRR
BR  does not Granger cause  ςRR
BR  21 --------  -------- 
Note: “--------“ substitutes p-values of more than 0.10.  
 
Table 6: Does( relative) domestic monetary policy volatility “cause” exchange rate 
volatility in Argentina and Brazil? Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Sample: 1980 2000 (lags: 2) 
Null Hypothesis:  Obs F-Statistic Probability
ςM1
AR  does not Granger cause  ςR
AR  19 --------  -------- 
ςMBase
BR  does not Granger cause  ςR
BR  20 --------  -------- 
ςMRel
AR, US  does not Granger cause  ςe
AR, US  19 --------  -------- 
ςMRel
BR, US  does not Granger cause  ςe
BR, US  20 --------  -------- 
Note: “--------“ substitutes p-values of more than 0.10.  
 - X - 
 
Table 7: Does relative domestic monetary policy volatility “cause” exchange rate 
volatility in Argentina (for limited sample excluding the currency board 
period)? Pairwise Granger Causality Tests  
 
Sample: 1980 1990 (lags: 2) 
Null Hypothesis:  Obs F-Statistic Probability
ςMRel
AR, US  does not Granger cause  ςe
AR, US  9 --------  -------- 
Note: “--------“ substitutes p-values of more than 0.10.  
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Figure 4: Correlation matrix (balanced sample 1980-2000): domestic interest 





AR  0.73  
ςMBase
BR   0.57 
 
Figure 5: Correlation matrix (balanced sample 1980-2000): exchange rate volatility 
and relative monetary volatility  (Mercosur vis-à-vis U.S.) 
  ςMRel
AR, US  ςMRel
BR, US 
ςe
AR, US  0.87  
ςe
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